EXCLUSIVE: Iran’s Take on the ‘Trump’ Corridor. The Follow-up.

In our previous article, Wyoming Star explored the Iranian reaction to the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process and the creation of the so-called Zangezur Corridor. Below is the summary with some additional commentary on the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus.

If you ask Tehran, the much-hyped transport link across Armenia’s Syunik province isn’t just another trade route—it’s a strategic pincer closing in. Iran’s reaction to the Zangezur Corridor (branded by Washington as the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” or TRIPP) has hardened as the project has moved from talking point to policy, with a US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan deal announced on Aug. 8, 2025, and Iran’s president rushing to Yerevan on Aug. 18–19 to seek guarantees that any new roads remain under Armenian sovereignty.

Here’s the short version: Azerbaijan wants a direct land link to Nakhchivan; Armenia wants investment without losing control; the US wants a signature connectivity win; and Iran sees a potential cordon tightening around its only stable Caucasus border—with Armenia.

Iran’s dilemma blends geography and geopolitics. A corridor slicing through Syunik could shrink Iran’s access to Armenia—its gateway to the Black Sea world—and shift leverage toward an Ankara–Baku axis that already cooperates closely with Israel. Iranian analysts warn this isn’t merely logistics; it’s a balance-of-power play that could edge NATO-linked influence deeper into Iran’s near-abroad.

Tehran’s line has been consistent: open roads under Armenian law, yes; create an extraterritorial corridor policed by outsiders, absolutely not. Iranian legal and strategic voices argue that alternatives already exist—chief among them the Iran-backed Aras Corridor—that connect Azerbaijan proper to Nakhchivan without eroding Armenia’s sovereignty or Iran’s access.

Dr. Ehsan Movahedian, an international relations specialist and Caucasus expert at Tehran’s ATU University, summed up the mood in stark terms:

“Iran opposes US intervention in the affairs of the Caucasus. Because in a situation where the US does not make any economic investments outside the United States and seeks to attract foreign capital, economic activity and investment on the Iranian border in the South Caucasus is a suspicious move. The purpose of this move, as recently stated in publications such as Forbes and articles by think tanks such as the Atlantic, etc., is to economically and geopolitically encircle Iran, Russia, and China. In the case of Iran, with the creation of the Trump route, the routes for the transfer of goods and energy from within Iran, as well as the North-South Corridor, will be weakened. Iran is worried that the US will deploy security and intelligence forces on the Iranian border under the pretext of economic activity, and if such an action is taken, Iran will definitely react. The creation of the Trump route in Armenia, along with the presence of Israeli, Takfiri, and separatist forces in Karabakh after its capture by Aliyev, the presence of these forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, and anti-Iranian developments in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, has no meaning other than the US’s attempt to encircle Iran. Iran’s only safe border in the South Caucasus is the border with Armenia, which the US wants to make insecure and complete the encirclement of Iran. The Caucasus has been culturally and civilizationally influenced by Iran since the distant past, and the Persian language and Iranian poetry are still prevalent in these countries and have experienced various developments at different historical stages, and now it is an important buffer zone between the two valuable seas of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and has played and continues to play a very important role in the transfer of energy, peace, stability, and regional balance. Therefore, Iran does not want to lose access to this region. Iran wants the transfer of gas from Central Asian countries to Europe to be carried out through Iran. The Iranian route is safe, cheap, fast, and integrated, and completely on land, and it is also logical. However, the Trans-Caspian route is through different countries, by sea and land, and is accompanied by many problems. However, the US, with the aim of weakening Iran and supporting Israel in the next war with Iran, wants this route not to be formed from within Iran.”

Movahedian’s argument aligns with what many in Tehran’s policy circles are saying: the corridor’s branding may change (Zangezur to TRIPP), but the perceived intent—strategic encirclement and erosion of Iran’s transit leverage—remains the same.

During President Masoud Pezeshkian’s August visit, Armenia publicly vowed that any route would stay under Armenian jurisdiction with Armenian security forces—not foreign troops. That pledge is exactly the kind of guarantee Iran is chasing, because the nightmare scenario for Tehran is a de facto foreign-controlled area cutting through southern Armenia.

Iranian experts stress there’s no need to reinvent the wheel. The Aras Corridor offers road/rail links via Iran that give Baku what it wants—connectivity—without creating a corridor that could cut Iran off from Armenia. Beyond that, Tehran leans into the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) as its grand strategy: keep cargo and energy routes flowing through Iran (safe, shorter, all-land) rather than around it via patchwork Trans-Caspian chains.

Iranian rhetoric has swung from hard-edged warnings (even hinting at force to block any extraterritorial “corridor”) to more measured reassurances after Yerevan’s sovereignty pledge. That fluctuation mirrors an internal tug-of-war between hawks and pragmatists—and uncertainty about how far Russia will actually go to back Iran’s position if push comes to shove.

If the TRIPP plan operates strictly under Armenian law, Iran may tolerate it while doubling down on the Aras/INSTC tracks. If jurisdiction creeps toward any third-party control, expect Tehran to harden its stance and showcase alternatives. Skirmishes around Syunik would turbocharge Iranian fears and could trigger visible countermoves, from military signaling to transit re-pricing. If the main beneficiaries are Azerbaijan–Turkey supply chains with Western backing, Tehran will read the corridor as zero-sum. If Armenia and Iran both gain real access and revenue, the politics get less combustible.

Iran doesn’t see a highway. It sees a potential hand on the tap of its northern reach—economically and strategically. Keep the road under Armenian sovereignty, and Tehran will grumble but adapt. Tip it toward extraterritorial control or security footprints near its border, and the response will move from statements to statecraft. In the South Caucasus, the asphalt is political—and for Iran, this stretch is a red line.