ANALYSIS: US firms circle the Zangezur route. Armenia’s sovereignty is the collateral.

American money is eyeing Syunik. The US Development Finance Corporation’s Kenneth Angell just said the quiet part out loud: US companies “will be happy” to bid on Zangezur-corridor projects once tenders open, and Armenia could even charge tolls. He also flagged the obvious—this only flies with “security guarantees” and serious diplomacy. Translation: big contracts, long concessions, and rules that may outlive governments.

On paper, that sounds like investment. In practice, it’s a sovereignty stress test.

After the August 8 Washington summit with Donald Trump, Ilham Aliyev, and Nikol Pashinyan, the headline deliverable was a US-branded transit scheme: the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) — a road/rail (and possibly energy) link across Armenia’s Syunik connecting mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Washington’s wording avoided the loaded term “corridor,” stressing “unhindered communication” under state sovereignty and jurisdiction.

Baku didn’t get that memo. Aliyev keeps calling it the “Zangezur corridor”, publicly and pointedly—framing it as a strategic artery of the Middle Corridor. Meanwhile, Yerevan says no extraterritoriality. Fact-checkers in Yerevan also note Baku’s ongoing preconditions — including constitutional changes in Armenia — despite the Washington text saying, effectively, hands off each other’s internal affairs.

Into this semantic knife fight walks US capital. If the operating model is a foreign-run concession with “security guarantees,” you’ve created the exact ambiguity sovereignty hawks fear: de jure Armenian territory, de facto special regime.

Infrastructure corridors aren’t built on press releases; they’re built on 30-year contracts. The operator’s rights—dispatching trains, allocating slots, setting tariffs, controlling data, enforcing safety, deciding closures—are what matter. Couple that with stabilization clauses (no adverse regulatory change), international arbitration (think ICSID), and step-in rights for lenders, and you can end up with contractual extraterritoriality even while maps stay the same.

Ask three blunt questions now, before the ink dries:

1. Who controls the gate? Customs, border checks, police powers and emergency closures must remain exclusively Armenian—in law and in practice.
2. Who decides when it shuts? If conflict resumes and Yerevan needs to suspend traffic, does a US consortium (or Baku) get to sue Armenia for “expropriation” or lost profits?
3. Where is the courtroom? If disputes sit in offshore arbitration, not Armenian courts, you’ve outsourced leverage.

Angell’s line about “security guarantees” is the most delicate. If “guarantees” morph into foreign security personnel, joint patrols, or no-search clauses, you’ve recreated the worst version of a corridor—Lachin-style politics without the peacekeepers.

Angell was candid: Turkey wants the route; Russia and Iran don’t. That triangulation is real. A US-blessed, Turkey-enabled artery that bypasses both Russia and Iran shifts the region’s logistics and power map. Good for diversification; explosive for Armenian risk if deterrence is weak. Syunik becomes a pressure point for any actor who wants to punish Armenia or the project’s backers. If Baku keeps tying peace to Armenia’s constitution, the corridor becomes a hostage lever, not a bridge.

Tolls sound attractive. But corridors often come with volume guarantees, FX protections, and state backstops. If traffic underperforms—or politics freeze flows—Armenia could end up paying availability fees to keep the project bankable. And if an American operator gets exclusive rights over road, rail and even energy lines, you’ve concentrated economic choke points in one private hub with a foreign escalator to Washington.

Yes, TRIPP’s boosters pitch new hubs, jobs, and Western capital. All plausible—if the governance is sovereign-proof. If not, you’ve traded one dependency (on Russian security) for two: Azerbaijani transit leverage and contractual leverage of US consortia.

If Yerevan insists on a transit deal, it should legislate a pro-sovereignty operating model up front. Here’s the minimum:

1. Terminology lock-in: Law names the regime “transport communications under Armenian jurisdiction”; bans “corridor” language in all official texts and contracts.
2. Armenian command chain: Customs, border control, policing, inspections, and closures are exclusively Armenian functions on every meter of the route.
3. No foreign security presence: Operators provide unarmed staff; any armed protection is Armenian state—full stop.
4. Emergency brake clause: Armenia may suspend or restrict traffic immediately for security or public order; no damages owed for good-faith action.
5. Tariff and access sovereignty: Armenia sets baseline tariffs and access rules, reviewed by an independent Armenian regulator, not by the operator.
6. Dispute forum on Armenian terms: Primary venue: Armenian courts. Any arbitration must be in Armenia, Armenian law governing, with narrow scope; preclude “creeping expropriation” claims from public-interest regulation.
7. Data and audit control: All operational data (cargo, telemetry, manifests) stored in-country; real-time access for Armenian authorities; annual public audits.
8. No political preconditions: Corridor implementation is decoupled from constitutional amendments or any extraneous demands; violation by the other side triggers suspension.
9. Local content and labor: Binding targets for Armenian firms and workers, with skills transfer; environmental and community safeguards baked in.
10. Snap-back and sunset: Violations (incitement, blockades, armed threats) trigger snap-back suspension; concessions carry sunset dates, with periodic parliamentary review.

If investors balk at these guardrails, that tells you the business case depends on political leverage, not transport value.

Yerevan keeps saying no extraterritoriality; Baku keeps saying “Zangezur corridor.” The longer that mismatch persists, the greater the reputational risk in Brussels and the political risk in Syunik. If the operating company is American and the marketing keeps calling it “Zangezur,” Armenia will look like it outsourced both language and leverage.

Flip the script: publish the draft law and concession terms; hold a parliamentary hearing; invite independent legal and economic reviews. Sunlight is a sovereignty tool.

US companies lining up for tenders is not the issue. The operating model is. Build a normal transit regime—Armenian law, Armenian control, clear emergency powers—and TRIPP can be a sovereignty-positive way to monetize geography and de-risk energy and trade.

Build a contractual corridor—foreign “security guarantees,” offshore arbitration, exclusive control—and Armenia will have paved a road through Syunik that others can steer.

Investment follows rules. Make sure the rules belong to Armenia.