ANALYSIS: After the Aug. 8 deal. Is Armenia actually safer — and does Baku still threaten Yerevan?

Armenia’s leadership is selling a new thesis: security through legitimacy, not alliances. Since the Aug. 8 Washington declaration with Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has doubled down on that line, telling an international forum in Yerevan that Armenia is “more independent, more sovereign, and more secure than ever,” because it has anchored its policy in internationally recognized borders rather than in “classical” hard-power guarantees that failed when it mattered.

That’s a big pivot with equally big implications. So where does Armenian security really stand — and does Azerbaijan still pose a threat to Yerevan?

What actually changed on Aug. 8? Two things, at least on paper:

Legitimacy-first doctrine. Pashinyan says the cornerstone is Armenia’s own recognition of its 29,743 km² under the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, and the expectation of reciprocal recognition from Azerbaijan. He frames the 2022 Prague understanding on territorial integrity as the “strategic breakthrough” that underpins current efforts. The army’s job, he stresses, is narrowly defined: defend that recognized territory; everything else comes before force.

A new security environment. Security Council secretary Armen Grigoryan was blunt: the alliance-based model — read CSTO/Russia — didn’t deliver after 2020, nor during the May 2021 and September 2022 incursions, when the stock answer from allies was that borders weren’t delimited. Aug. 8, he argues, “comprehensively changed our security environment,” pushing Armenia to codify a different strategy.

Intelligence chief Kristinne Grigoryan went further this week: military threats are “very low” compared to months past, “largely due” to the Aug. 8 understandings and the groundwork from border work and diplomacy. But she also warned of hybrid and democratic threats from multiple actors, which the service won’t name publicly.

The near-term war risk is low. That’s the shared assessment from the political and intelligence leadership. Pashinyan even said “there will be no war… there will be peace,” and later, more emphatically, that “there is now peace.” Whether you buy the rhetoric or not, the temperature along the border is measurably lower than in past cycles.

The theory of the case is coherent. By rooting everything in international law and mapped borders, Yerevan is trying to turn every future skirmish into a case of undisputed aggression. That raises diplomatic costs for the aggressor, widens Armenia’s circle for defense cooperation and procurement, and reduces overreliance on any single guarantor.

Clearer missions reduce miscalculation. Defining the army’s mandate strictly to the recognized frontier narrows gray zones that previously invited escalation.

Here’s the uncomfortable part: peace on paper isn’t peace in practice, and Azerbaijan’s internal trajectory matters to Armenia’s external security.

Baku’s “negative peace.” Inside Azerbaijan, the post-war narrative is still built around the “iron fist.” Independent media have been dismantled; peace activists and journalists are jailed on dubious charges; and land borders remain closed under shifting justifications. That environment sustains a militarized mindset and dehumanizing rhetoric about Armenians. Even if command chains restrain soldiers, the information space keeps the country war-ready — and compromise-averse.

Detainees and justice issues linger. The fate of Armenian captives (including notable figures like Lt. Gen. Levon Mnatsakanyan) remains unresolved — a persistent humanitarian and political pressure point that can sour public opinion and hand hardliners a rallying cry.

Hybrid pressure beats tanks. Armenia’s own intelligence service is flagging hybrid attacks and threats to democracy as the live risks now. That can look like border pinpricks, economic levers, cyber ops, disinformation, or legal-lawfare — any of which can test Yerevan’s resolve without triggering a formal war.

Volatility is a feature, not a bug. As Armen Grigoryan noted, the regional environment is changing so fast that fixing a strategy is hard. The doctrine is legit; the neighborhood is not.

Does Azerbaijan still pose a threat to Yerevan? Short answer: A large-scale conventional attack looks unlikely in the near term. But capacity and intent aren’t the same thing — and Baku retains coercive options short of war. The threat has shifted from “tanks to Yerevan” scenarios to pressure campaigns that can chip away at Armenia’s sovereignty, economy, and politics without crossing bright red lines.

Armenia’s ‘law as shield’ bet is bold. In the short run, it seems to be working — the guns are quiet, the border talks move, and Yerevan has more room to maneuver internationally. But Baku’s domestic hardening means the threat hasn’t vanished; it has morphed. If Armenia anchors the map, professionalizes the guardrails, insists on humanitarian steps, and fortifies its democracy, the Aug. 8 moment can evolve from ceasefire vibes into durable security. If not, the region’s default setting — negative peace, easily reversed — will still be just one crisis away.