EXCLUSIVE: Moldova’s EU Story Meets Hard Election Reality
Source: Council for European Studies
Moldova is heading into parliamentary elections on 28 September, and the story the government is selling abroad (a shining European future, billions in EU support, an “irreversible” path to the West) looks increasingly out of sync with life on the ground. Prices have climbed, the trade deficit has widened, and public patience is wearing thin.
To cut through the slogans, Wyoming Star asked Veronica Anghel, a prominent US political scientist, to assess the government’s performance, the role of “Russia talk” in domestic politics, and how Transnistria/Russian-speaking communities factor into the vote.
Q: Moldova’s government promotes EU integration as a success story, yet living standards and the trade deficit have worsened. From your view, how transparent and effective has the Sandu/PAS administration been in handling public funds and economic reforms?
Veronica Anghel:
PAS has pursued real reforms such as judicial vetting, digitized public services, and infrastructure to cut energy and trade dependence. PAS also secured a three-year €1.9 billion EU plan tied to concrete milestones and commitments for the EU to enlarge to include Moldova.
Execution, though, has been uneven: the economy slipped into a technical recession, utilities rose 20–40 % despite subsidies, structural bottlenecks persist (distortionary farm subsidies, inefficient SOEs, regulatory drag, skills exodus), and anti-corruption delivery was slow until mid-2025 (notable steps include the 7-year sentence for Gagauzia’s governor and Plahotniuc’s arrest with extradition pending). Allegations of favoritism in contracting and perceptions of opacity remain.
Editor’s note:
This diagnosis matches what you hear in markets from Cahul to Bălți: some reform muscle, but inconsistent follow-through and a sense that political will peaks around Brussels milestones, not household outcomes. The longer that gap persists, the more “integration” reads as elite signalling rather than shared prosperity.
Q: Some critics argue the pro-EU government has used anti-Russian rhetoric to deflect from corruption and governance failures. How credible do you find those claims, and what evidence exists of such practices?
Veronica Anghel:
The security threat is substantial — vote-buying, illicit funding, cyberattacks, and disinformation linked to Moscow — so PAS emphasizing it is not fabricated. The government’s energy diversification choices responded to real coercion; that said, slow progress on prosecutions and economic strain make accusations of “deflection” politically resonant.
That’s the political rub: the threat is real, but the over-reliance on it as narrative has diminishing returns with voters who still can’t square rising bills with promised insulation from shocks.
Source: AP Photo
Editor’s note:
And yet another example of how political manipulation works: naming certain threats can be legitimate. But when prosecutions crawl and tariffs bite, many citizens hear “Russia” invoked as a catch-all explanation for domestic under-performance.
Q: Russia has repeatedly said it wants to protect the rights of Russian-speakers in Moldova and Transnistria. Do you think Moldova’s current policies toward Transnistria and Russian communities risk inflaming tensions, and how might that shape the election outcome?
Veronica Anghel:
The policies described target illegal financing, state capture, and energy security rather than linguistic rights, but Russia’s gas cutoff to Transnistria and higher prices have been weaponized to portray PAS as indifferent to Russian-speaking communities, while CEC bans (e.g., Pobeda) and prosecutions (e.g., Guțul) are cast as repression — combined with disinformation migrating to TikTok/Telegram, this likely heightens polarization, boosts turnout for sovereigntist and pro-Kremlin parties in strongholds like Gagauzia and Transnistria-adjacent areas, elevates “cheap energy via Russia” appeals, and makes urban and diaspora mobilization pivotal for PAS, with coalition bargaining the most probable post-election outcome.
Editor’s note:
Translation to the ballot box: polarisation up, PAS ceiling lower, sovereigntist lists more competitive in the south and east, and a post-election coalition the base case.
The bottom line
Moldova isn’t choosing between Europe and “elsewhere” so much as between performative geopolitics and performative governance. Some believe that PAS has delivered certain milestones; it has not delivered enough material wins to anchor them. If September 28 returns a fragmented parliament, it will be because voters judged that EU headlines did not add up to domestic competence.
Until the government matches integration rhetoric with transparent spending, faster justice, and lower household risk, outside validation will keep colliding with inside frustration, and Moldova’s European path will be decided less in Brussels press rooms than at Moldovan kitchen tables.
The latest news in your social feeds
Subscribe to our social media platforms to stay tuned