EXCLUSIVE:Ukraine Can “Win It All,” Trump Says. But Is Anything Really Changing?

For three years the war in Ukraine has looked like a modernized version of a WWI — trenches, dug-ins, and little movement — with drones sprinkled overhead. Suddenly, from the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, President Donald Trump blasted out a new message: Ukraine can “fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.” He even labeled Russia’s military a “paper tiger.” It’s an attention-grabbing pivot from a leader who had repeatedly floated land-for-peace tradeoffs. The question is whether this is a real shift — or just headline fuel without the policy to match.

Trump’s line landed after his meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky in New York and tracked with a broader UN-week theme from the White House: national sovereignty, skepticism of multilateralism, and a preference for transactional leverage. In his official recap, the administration praised “sovereignty” and swiped at “globalism” — a posture that often pairs rhetorical muscle with demands for more European/NATO burden-sharing. Reuters and AP both framed the Ukraine statement as a “dramatic” or “rhetorical” shift, while Trump himself said Europe, “particularly NATO,” should front more of the bill. That’s classic Trump: outcome-maximalist language, wallet-minimalist follow-through — at least so far.

The closest thing to a concrete follow-on: the administration is considering allowing allies to route Tomahawk-class long-range missiles to Ukraine. Vice President JD Vance says the call is the president’s to make; Kyiv wants the range to target Russian logistics and command nodes far beyond the front. Considering isn’t committing, but it’s more than a flat “no.”

Reuters’ readout of the pivot noted no new US sanctions announced and no fresh grant-based military aid requested from Congress. Trump told reporters NATO should be able to shoot down Russian jets that violate allied airspace, but he also hedged that direct US backup would “depend on the circumstance.” The Kremlin shrugged off the “Ukraine can win it all” line as a Zelenskyy-induced mistake. Net: big words, small print.

While the rhetoric ricocheted around Manhattan, Russia launched one of the largest combined drone-and-missile barrages of the war — 595 drones/decoys and 48 missiles — hitting Kyiv and multiple regions. Ukraine’s air force said it shot down or jammed 566 drones and 45 missiles, a testament to improved defenses but also a reminder: the onslaught is very much alive. Civilians were killed; energy and industrial infrastructure took hits; Poland scrambled jets as spillover risk rose. None of that looks like an enemy collapsing on its own timetable.

Zelensky’s answer isn’t to wait for Moscow to tire; it’s to scale Western air defenses and long-range strike. Speaking to the Warsaw Security Forum, he proposed a joint aerial shield with European partners and offered Ukrainian training for allied crews — practical steps to harden NATO’s flank and relieve Ukraine’s overtaxed interceptors. That pitch dovetails with allied talk of a “drone wall” and faster defense-industrial integration.

Michael McFaul, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science, Director and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a former US Ambassador to the Russian Federation during the Obama administration, remains cautious about the sudden changes in Trump’s approach:

“When Trump imposes a new sanction on Russia and asks Congress for new funds for military assistance to Ukraine (and not just selling US weapons to European countries), then we will know that he’s ready to back up his words with actions.”

Steve Pifer, an affiliate of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a former US ambassador to Ukraine, sees it as an attempt to push solving this conflict onto the Europeans:

“The President’s change in rhetoric regarding Ukraine is welcome and likely reflects his frustration with Putin, who has essentially ignored five deadlines that Trump set for the Kremlin to change course. The more serious question is whether Trump will do anything — e.g., tighten sanctions on Russia, provide military assistance (as opposed to sales) to Kyiv — to bolster Ukraine in its struggle against Russia. Thus far, he has taken no actions to put pressure on the Kremlin to get it to alter its policy. He may instead be seeking to place the burden on Ukraine and Europe so that he can walk away, though that would still be widely seen as a failure for Trump’s diplomacy.”

Timothy Ash, an associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House and a senior sovereign strategist at RBC Bluebay Asset Management in London, has a bleak outlook on recent developments:

 “It is hard reading Trump generally, as he flip-flops quite a lot on issues, particularly pertaining to Ukraine. This latest one is a case in point, in February calling Zelensky out for having nod cards, but this week seemingly suggesting that Zelensky is a great leader and has a path to victory. My read here is that Trump likes quick wins. He thought he could deliver a quick win on the Ukraine war — given his supposed great relationship with Putin — but I think he has now realized this war is more difficult and Putin is a tough opponent who lies for fun, as an occupation. So I think what we saw this week is an effort by Trump to distance himself from the Ukraine war — see the last comments in his Truth Social post: over to you, good luck. I think he is passing the buck for failure in peace talks to Europe. The sad thing here is that I think a peace deal was possible, but Trump screwed up negotiations. Whoever won the US elections, I think both sides wanted to talk. Trump has all the cards — he could have forced Putin to accept a peace acceptable to Ukraine by ramping up sanctions on Russia and increasing arms supplies to Ukraine. He also had lots to negotiate around with Putin – NATO membership, bilateral security guarantees, territory, sanctions, and arms supplies. But almost immediately upon taking office, he gave everything up to Putin — no NATO or security guarantees for Ukraine, Russia keeps all the territory it currently holds and more, and offers of sanctions relief and business deals. Putin could not believe his luck, he saw weakness and thought, “If I hold out longer, I will get everything I want.” Trump effectively handed Ukraine on a plate to Russia.”

Trump’s UN week was a return to form: sharply skeptical of the body itself, dismissive of multilateral problem-solving, and heavy on “nation-state sovereignty.” Reuters captured the tone—combative, critical, and not particularly invested in the UN as a venue. That message resonates with Americans who see the institution as toothless; it also sidelines the place where sanctions coalitions and diplomatic guardrails usually get built. If Washington slams the UN while outsourcing costs to Europe, the center of gravity shifts to NATO and ad hoc coalitions — faster at times, thinner in legitimacy when global buy-in is needed.

Trump’s foreign policy brand is transactional. In practice, that often means tariffs and burden-sharing over unconditional commitments. His Ukraine post leans the same way: Europe (and especially NATO) should finance the heavy lift; the US will keep supplying weapons to NATO, for NATO “to do what they want with them.” That’s a far cry from announcing a new US grant-aid package or a sanctions surge that bites the Kremlin’s war economy. Whether that model can generate the time, mass, and munitions Ukraine needs is unresolved.

Militarily, retaking every inch — including Crimea — requires three things at scale: long-range capability, layered air defense, and ammo/industry financing to outpace Russia’s replenishment.

Politically, total liberation depends on a united coalition that stops drip-feeding capability and starts front-loading it — with escalation management baked in. That will test Washington’s appetite for risk and Europe’s capacity to move from declarations to deliveries.

So—can Ukraine “win it all back,” or is this just talk? As McFaul wrote on X:

“Trump has changed his words about Putin but not his policies. So far, he’s imposed no new sanctions against Russia nor called upon Congress to approve new military assistance to Ukraine. I hope that will change. I fear it will not.”