EXCLUSIVE: Operations Epstein Fury Part 7.2. Houthis Join the War. The Follow-up.

The war with Iran was already stretching across borders, economies, and political narratives. Now it’s stretching across water. The entry – formal or not – of Yemeni Houthis into the conflict threatens to transform an already volatile situation into a full-scale maritime crisis centered on one of the world’s most critical shipping arteries: the Red Sea.

This new development is a continuation of a pattern that has been visible for years, only now amplified by the scale of the Iran war. As US strikes deepen and Israeli operations persist, Tehran’s network of regional allies is doing what it has long been structured to do – expand the battlefield without matching conventional force with force. The Houthis are the most effective piece of that network when it comes to maritime disruption.

Recent reporting shows a widening gap between political messaging and realities on the ground.

US leadership signals are completely contradictory, from statements that the war may be “winding down” to bombing Iran into ‘the Stone Ages.’ The operational tempo with strikes on Iranian infrastructure, including power facilities, continues the pressure campaign. Tehran, for its part, has denied any intention of backing down. Markets reacted instantly – oil spiked, stocks dipped, and the global economy flinched.

That tension – between declared endings and actual escalation – creates the conditions in which proxy actors thrive.

The Houthis are already signaling their next move. Threats to shut down key Red Sea chokepoints, particularly if Gulf states formally join the conflict, are not rhetorical flourishes. The group has demonstrated both the capability and the willingness to target commercial shipping, naval assets, and energy infrastructure.

A renewed Red Sea crisis would not simply be a repeat of the 2023–2025 shipping disruptions. It would most likely be worse. The global shipping industry has not fully recovered from earlier Houthi attacks, with traffic through the southern Red Sea still below pre-crisis levels. Insurance premiums remain elevated. Rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope continues to add time and cost to global trade flows.

Dr. Ian Ralby, President of Auxilium Worldwide and an expert in maritime and supply chain security, captures the strategic dilemma in stark terms:

“As the second month of the American and Israeli “excursion” in Iran continues to grind on and expand in its global impact, the obsession with tactical success is once again standing in the face of strategic failings. When the Houthis began attacking ships in November 2019, at least three military operations were launched. Operation Prosperity Guardian by Combined Maritime Forces and Operation Aspides by the European Union Naval Force were both defensive missions to protect ships from attacks, and Operation Poseidon Archer was an offensive mission by the US and UK to attack Houthi capabilities inside Yemen. A readout of those efforts is incredibly impressive in terms of the numbers of missiles, drones, and autonomous systems intercepted by the various militaries. But what did they achieve? Two and a half years later, shipping through the southern Red Sea remains minimal compared to its levels before the Houthi attacks. A failure to understand the Houthi mentality, as well as key factors like the asymmetric advantage of attacking ships with $5,000 drones that require $1 million countermeasures to combat them, meant that the missions against the Houthis were operationally successful but failed to achieve the strategic end state of eliminating the threat to shipping. The 2025 bombing campaigns by the Americans and Israelis did lead to at least a pause in Houthi aggression, but by no means were the Houthis eliminated. Now, as Iran is taking a similar asymmetric approach that is having even greater impact on the global economy, military attacks against the 17th largest country in the world are unlikely to diminish the voracity of the Iranian will to hold on to its key strategic asset: the Strait of Hormuz. Once again we are hearing of the incredible tactical success of the military campaign against the conventional forces of Iran, and yet the Strait remains closed to anyone who does not pay Iran a toll (in Chinese Yuan or Russian Rubles) and receive its direct blessing for protection. So for all the impressive “successes” discussed in press briefings on the tactical and operational efforts, it is hard to see what a strategic victory would look like at this point. And compounding that problem, Iran can escalate its retaliation in critical ways that would further hurt the global economy. In addition to physically attacking corporate entities as it has now begun to do, Iran can greatly increase its cyber offensive on critical aspects of American and Israeli life. And furthermore, Iran can ask for help from their closest ally, the Houthis, to do what they do best and create a new wave of chaos. While the Houthis are making moves to resume attacks on ships, they have also indicated a desire and ability to attack infrastructure, including naval and port facilities in Djibouti. And further down the Horn of Africa, they have been building their own alliances with terrorist groups enamored by the perceived Houthi success. Those entities could become a further point of pressure on the already considerably beleaguered maritime sector that remains responsible for transporting 90% of world trade. Attacks come with consequences, and whatever the ambitions of the US and Israel were at the outset, many are now focused on finding new ways to undo the second and third order effects of Operation Epic Fury. With the Houthis in the wings and various levels of chaotic escalation now visible on the horizon, this could be a considerable challenge for years to come. For all the tactical successes, it is unlikely that global uncertainty was the strategic objective, yet that seems to now be inevitable and indefinite.”

His warning cuts through the daily cycle of battlefield updates. Tactical wins do not necessarily translate into strategic gains. In fact, they may mask a deeper failure to alter the underlying dynamics of the conflict.

The economic implications are already coming into focus. Analysts warn that expanded Houthi activity could intensify pressure on global oil markets, particularly if disruptions in the Red Sea coincide with continued instability in the Strait of Hormuz. That dual chokehold would strain supply chains in ways not seen in decades. Shipping costs would spike. Energy prices would follow. Inflationary pressures, which many economies are only beginning to tame, could surge again.

There is also a psychological dimension. The perception that key maritime routes are no longer secure has a cascading effect. Companies hedge. Insurers withdraw coverage. Governments deploy naval assets, which in turn raises the risk of direct confrontation.

The Houthis understand this. Every successful attack reinforces the idea that the Red Sea is contested space. Every near miss does the same. Over time, that perception becomes reality.

The Red Sea is the next pressure point of the US/Israeli military endeavor in Iran, and it is one the global economy can ill afford to lose.